

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE 425 Eye Street N.W. BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F Washington, D.C. 20536

File:

WAC 01 277 52950

Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date:

AY 16 2003

IN RE: Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to § 203(b)(3) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



PUBLIC COPY

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

> Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a publications firm. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a market research analyst. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an individual labor certification, the Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA 750), approved by the Department of Labor.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant requires an offer of employment accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at wage. the time the priority date is established until the continuing beneficiary obtains permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Eligibility in this matter hinges on the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered as of the petition's priority date, which is the date the request for labor certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). The petition's priority date in this instance is February 2, 1996. The beneficiary's salary as stated on the labor certification is \$2,420 per month or \$29,040 per year.

Counsel initially submitted insufficient evidence of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In a request for evidence (RFE) dated December 7, 2001, the director required

additional evidence to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The RFE required the petitioner's federal income tax return, annual report or audited financial statement from 1996 to the present, Forms DE-6 for the eight (8) quarters, and Forms W-2 and W-3.

Counsel submitted, for 2001, the petitioner's Form 100, California Corporation Franchise Income Tax Return and quarterly Forms DE-6. The California tax return for 2001 reflected a net loss of (\$8,823), less than the proffered wage.

The director determined that the evidence did not establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage and denied the petition.

Counsel offers the petitioner's federal tax returns for 1996 to 2001, its unaudited financial statement as of January 31, 2002, its advertising brochure, and a copy of its weekly issue of May 2-9, 2002, Vol. 10, No. 19. Counsel's brief attaches exhibits, 1-10.

Counsel argues:

Petitioner's ability to pay the beneficiary's wages of \$29,040.00 may be established by the following factors: increasing gross profit and net profit from 1998, increasing asset-liability ratio from 1996, favorable projected income for 2002 and operating alliance with another company.

On the contrary, in determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, the Bureau [formerly the Service] will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well-established by judicial precedent. Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd., 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983).

In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, the court held that the Bureau had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F.Supp. at 1084.

Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." See also Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F.Supp. at 1054.

Counsel summarizes the petitioner's net income for 1996 to 2001 and includes a projection for 2002. In no year does the net income equal or exceed the proffered wage.

Counsel relies on net current assets, the difference of current assets and current liabilities, increasing from \$40,035 in 1999, to \$79,127 in 2000, and to \$93,348 in 2001, equal to or greater than the proffered wage. The ability to pay the proffered wage must be established as of the priority date, and net current assets were a deficit from 1996 to 1998.

The petitioner must show that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage with particular reference to the priority date of the petition. In addition, it must demonstrate that financial ability and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. See Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142, 145 (Acting Reg. Comm. 1977); Matter of Wing's Tea House, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977); Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1989). The regulations require proof of eligibility at the priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(1) and (12).

Counsel states that the petitioner's operating alliance with LBC USA Mabuhay Corp. guarantees continued operations. It is unclear when the alliance began, but it did not produce evidence of the ability to pay the proffered wage at the priority date of the petition.

Furthermore, the assets and income of this other corporation cannot be considered as those of the petitioner to justify the ability to pay the proffered wage. Contrary to counsel's primary assertion, the Bureau (formerly the Service), may not "pierce the corporate veil" and look to the assets of the corporation's owner to satisfy the corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. It is an elementary rule that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners and shareholders. See Matter of M, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958), Matter of Aphrodite Investments, Ltd., 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980), and Matter of Tessel, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980). Consequently, assets of its shareholders or of other enterprises or corporations can not be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage.

After a review of the federal tax returns, the advertising

brochure, and the brief on appeal, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had sufficient available funds to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.